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We seek to understand the relationship between employer decisions regarding which health plans
firms choose to offer to their employees and the performance of those plans. We measure
performance using data from the Health Plan Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) and the
Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey (CAHPS). We use a unique data set that lists the
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) available to, and offered by, large employers across
markets in the year 2000, and examine the relationship between plan offerings, performance
measures and other plan characteristics. We estimate two sets of specifications that differ in whether
they model plan choice as a function of absolute plan performance or plan performance relative to
competitors. We find that employers are more likely to offer plans with strong absolute and relative
HEDIS and CAHPS performance measures. Our results are consistent with the view that large
employers are responsive to the interests of their employees.
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1. Introduction
More than 90% of privately insured individuals obtain their health insurance from their
employer or as dependents of a family member with employer-sponsored health insurance
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 2000). The employer-based health insurance system
provides several benefits, most notably the ability to mitigate the adverse selection problem
inherent in insurance by pooling the health risks across employees of a company. The system also
enjoys institutional advantages such as the exemption of premiums from income taxes.
Although potentially welfare-improving, the employer-based health insurance system is
only efficient to the extent that employers choose appropriate health insurance coverage for their
workers. Employers generally limit the set of health plans that employees can choose. Indeed,
about 40% of workers are offered only one plan (McLaughlin 1999, Rice et al. 2002).
In a world with complete information and competitive labor markets, one might expect
employers to act as agents for their employees when choosing which set of health plans to offer.
This would allow them to maximize worker utility for any given level of compensation. Wages
would adjust to reflect the cost of benefits. If the employers offered an inefficient benefit
package, total compensation would need to rise to meet worker’s reservation utility. Thus, we
would expect employers to choose a menu of health plans that reflects the preferences of their
employees in terms of price and quality.
While price and coverage benefits for health plans are generally contractible and
observable, the quality of care is often not. This is particularly true for managed care plans as
these plans influence the health care that their enrollees receive through the choice of physician
networks and payment incentives. Although a series of studies suggest that at the margin,
employees respond to health plan performance information (Scanlon et al. 2002, Wedig and Tai-2
Seale 2002, Beaulieu 2002), studies find that many consumers in the market for health insurance
are not fully informed about plan performance (Hibbard and Jewett 1996, Jewett and Hibbard
1996). If information about plan performance is partly unobservable to employees, then
employers may have an incentive to provide cheaper, and lower quality, health plans than would
be desired by their employees if they were perfectly informed. Employers may also have the
incentive to offer lower performing plans in order to discourage individuals who may expect to
incur high health care costs from seeking employment at the firm.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the relationship between health plan
performance and the employer offerings of health plans. In particular, we seek to understand the
association between the plan offerings of large employers, the price of health plans, and
observable measures of performance. A finding that employers offer plans with better
performance scores suggests that employers may be internalizing the preferences of their
employees and refutes critiques that employers only care about low premiums. We focus on large
employers because they are likely to be better informed about health plan performance and thus
more likely to be responsive to such data. Moreover, given the evidence that workers in large
firms earn more than other workers (Brown and Medoff 1989) we might expect large employers
to disproportionately choose high quality plans.
Our analysis makes use of a unique data set that provides HMO health plan offerings by
MSA for several large employers for the year 2000. We combine these data with several other
data sources that provide plan price, observable plan performance measures and plan availability
by MSA. To our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically use data on employer plan
offerings to examine the relationship between health plan choices of large employers and plan
performance measures.3
Our data on plan performance are based on measures from the Health Plan Employer
Data Information Set (HEDIS) and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plan Survey (CAHPS),
reported by the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA). These measures are the most
commonly accepted systems for measuring plan quality. Many of the measures of performance
contained in HEDIS were developed in the early 1990s by a coalition of health plans and
employers. They include data largely obtained from administrative records, such as availability of
primary care providers, utilization of preventive/screening services (e.g. immunization and
cancer screening rates), and utilization of services thought to be appropriate in specific clinical
situations (e.g. prescription of ß-blockers following a heart attack or eye exams for diabetics). In
contrast, CAHPS measures performance from the enrollee perspective based on surveys of health
plan enrollees. Typically survey responses are aggregated into index scores of performance along
key dimensions such as “getting needed care” or “how doctors communicate.”
It is important to note that quality is multi-dimensional and very difficult to measure, and
that these measures are imperfect indicators of quality at best. Nevertheless, these measures are
generally considered the best available proxies for health plan quality and are predominant as
tools for quality measurement. For example, the HEDIS and CAHPS measures are the foundation
of most health plan report cards and also are the primary standardized set of output measures that
plans use to demonstrate quality to individual and group purchasers. Moreover, the NCQA
requires plans to report HEDIS and CAHPS measures in order to achieve accreditation and many
employers such as General Motors also require them from plans with which they contract.
The literature examining the relationship between plan performance and choice focuses
on individual behavior.  Cross sectional analysis relating enrollment decisions to plan
performance does not find a strong relationship between the administrative HEDIS measures of4
performance and enrollment, even when information on performance was provided to employees
(Chernew and Scanlon 1998).
1 Given the lack of correlation between employee choices and
HEDIS measures, it is informative to understand the relationship between large employer plan
offerings and performance measures.
There is some survey information about the factors that employers report as influencing
their choice of plans. In an American Management Association survey of more than 1,100
benefits managers, the cost to the company was ranked the most important of six factors. In a
KPMG 1997 survey, only 40% of employers rated NCQA accreditation as either very or
somewhat important; 95% regarded price of plan or speed and accuracy of claims payment as
very or somewhat important (Health Benefits 1997).
Our analysis examines how the likelihood of an employer offering an available health
plan in an MSA depends on plan performance and price measures. One significant complication
is that employers in our data set often offer more than one plan, implying that standard
multinomial choice models (e.g. multinomial logit) cannot be used. Thus, we estimate the plan
offer decision with binomial logit choice models, treating each offer decision as a separate
outcome. We include employer-MSA fixed effects in many specifications. For these
specifications, the coefficients on plan attributes are identified based on relative plan
performance; for the other specifications, it is absolute performance that matters.
These specifications both reveal similar results. In particular, we find that the employers
are more likely to offer plans with higher CAHPS and HEDIS ratings, suggesting that employers
                                                
1Longitudinal studies designed to explicitly measure the impact of report cards on employee plan choices do find an
effect of performance information on plan choice by employees (Scanlon et al. 2002, Chernew et al., 2001). These
findings are consistent with evidence that shows a statistically significant, though sometime quantitatively small,
impact of report cards on choice of medical care providers (Mukamel and Mushlin 1998, Dranove et al. 2002,
Mennemeyer et al. 1997).5
are responsive to the concerns of enrollees, as reflected by their survey responses. Additionally,
employers also choose cheaper plans, all else being equal.
To understand whether large employers are systematically different from other purchasers
of health insurance, we also estimate the relationship between health plan performance and
MSA-level health plan market share. This analysis will capture behavior of small and medium
firms as well. Although the magnitudes are not directly comparable to our large firm analysis,
because they capture the enrollment decisions as well as offer decisions, we find qualitatively
similar results to those from the analysis of employer plan offerings. Specifically, plans with
better performance scores have greater market shares.
The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides the model and
methods. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4 the results. Section 5 provides a discussion
and conclusion.
2. Model and Methods
Ideally, we would like to test whether the set of health plans that employers choose to
offer represents the preferences of their employees or alternately, whether a lack of information
distorts the market. As we do not have a direct method of conducting such a test, we instead
examine the relationship between health plan performance measures and plan offering. If
employers disproportionately choose high quality plans, this suggests that employers are
responding to employee preferences, although we cannot determine if they are responding
optimally. A lack of correlation between the measures of performance and plan offering is harder
to interpret. It may reflect factors such as ignorance on the part of employers or employees,6
skepticism of the performance measures, or a desire for cheaper plans by employers or
employees.
Importantly, we will not interpret a finding of a relationship between ratings and plan
offerings as indicative of whether employers are reacting to the plan performance measures
directly. Although many large employers request performance measures from plans, it is not clear
that employers are aware of the actual scores, and some of the measures are not even available to
employers. Thus, we will take such a finding to be indicative of the equilibrium relationship
between plan performance and offering.
We envision a profit maximizing model of the employer choice of health plan, for an
employer e with a group of employees in MSA m. The employer is faced with a set of HMO
health plans,  j1 , , J ∈ … , that are in the MSA. The employer can choose to offer any subset of the
available plans to its employees, and will presumably charge the employees some price for each
plan, partly through lower wages. The analysis is made conceptually difficult by the fact that
employers can, and do, choose to offer more than one HMO to their employees. We account for
this by allowing employers to choose the subset of plans that maximizes profits over the set of all
possible health plan combinations.
Most generally, the subset of plans that is offered will be a function of the traits of all of
the plans in the market. It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate this fully general choice
model. Instead, we model the choice of each plan as a function of the characteristics of that plan
and of the employer/MSA. This is likely to be a reasonable approximation of the actual7
determinants of health plan offering except when the correlation of choices across plans is
important.
2
We estimate the plan offering decision using a binomial logit choice model. We include
two sets of specifications. One set controls for employer and MSA characteristics by including
fixed effects for employer/MSA combinations. The other set does not control for employer or
MSA characteristics. For the fixed effects specifications, any relationship between plan traits and
the number of plans offered will be completely captured by the fixed effects and will not identify
the coefficients of interest. Thus, the coefficients of interest are identified exclusively by whether
plans that have a relatively higher value of a characteristic are more likely to be in the set of
plans offered by an employer. This implies that the fixed effects estimation will find a negative
price coefficient if employers tend to offer the cheaper plans within a market, all else being
equal, but not if employers in markets with all cheap plans tend to offer more plans.
3
To formalize, let  emj offer  be a 0-1 indicator variable for whether employer e in MSA m













In (1), the x variables represent plan characteristics, such as ratings and price information, while
the β’s are the coefficients of interest. The α’s are the employer/MSA fixed effects.
                                                
2As an example, correlated choices would occur if employers offer a high-quality, expensive plan and a low-quality,
inexpensive plan, in order to span the preferences of diverse employees.
3Another implication is that the offering decisions of an employer that offers all or no plans in an MSA will solely
affect the fixed effect for that employer/MSA, and not the parameters of interest. One employer offered no HMOs in8













Note that (2) differs from (1) only in the exclusion of the α fixed effects.
We estimate our specifications based on (2) using maximum likelihood. Define
  () emj emj offer ,x β  to be the random variable that indicates plan offering as a function of parameters
and exogenous data based on (2).
4 As is standard in the literature, the log likelihood function is:
(3) ()  () () emj emj
e,m,j
lnL ,x lnPr offer offer ,x β= = β ∑ .
Define    () emj em emj offer , ,x αβ  to be the corresponding function to    () emj emj offer ,x β  for the
fixed effects model based on (1). While it is possible to write the likelihood function for (1) in an
analogous manner to (3), it is not feasible to estimate (1) with maximum likelihood, because each
employer/MSA fixed effect is a separate parameter.
Instead, we estimate the fixed effects specification using the conditional maximum
likelihood estimator proposed by Chamberlain (1980). The estimator maximizes
                                                                                                                                                            
the four MSAs in which it operated that are in our final sample, but did offer HMOs in MSAs that we excluded
because of missing data.
4 Note that    () emj emj offer ,x β  is the random variable that indicates the probability of offering conditional on
parameters, while  emj offer  is the is the actual offering decision in the data set.9
(4) ()  ()
J
emj emj emj emk
e,m,j k 1
lnCL ,x lnPr offer offer , ,x offer
=

β≡ = α β 
 ∑∑ ,
which is the probability of plan offering conditional on the number of plans offered by the
employer/MSA. Chamberlain (1980) shows that the estimator based on (4) is consistent (though
not efficient) and that the α fixed effects drop out of (4), making it a function solely of () ,x β
that is feasible to compute.
We report robust standard errors for all of our estimates that we compute using bootstrap
techniques. For the fixed effects specifications based on (1), we allow for clustering at the
employer/MSA level (consistent with the fixed effects), while the specifications based on (2)
allow for clustering at the plan/MSA level. The bootstrapped standard errors provide a method
for evaluating the power of our estimates that controls for the fact that there may be dependence
of observations within the unit of clustering.
Our specifications are based only on plan traits and employer/MSA fixed effects. Ideally
we would model employer plan choice as a function of employer and employee traits, in order to
understand how these different traits affect health plan choice. However, we do not have any data
on the characteristics of employees, such as age or gender, which would allow us to identify the
impact of alternate employee characteristics on plan offerings.
3. Data
We combine several sources of data. These include data on employer health plan
offerings, health plan availability and market share by MSA, health plan performance measures,10
health plan prices and other health plan characteristics. We discuss each of these data sources in
turn and then discuss our strategies for dealing with missing data.
3.1 Employer choice of health plan
The primary data for this project come from survey responses for a sample of large
employers, conducted by The MEDSTAT Group. Employers were asked to indicate the HMO
plans they offered in the year 2000, by region (e.g., north Texas or eastern Pennsylvania), based
on a census of HMO plans and operating regions provided by InterStudy. Medstat asked 44
employers to participate in the survey. Of these 44, 12 explicitly declined to participate and 17
provided data for inclusion in this paper. Firms that participated range in size from about 10,000
to 225,000 U.S. employees, with an average size of about 65,000.
5 By focusing on large firms,
this work explores the segment of the market most likely to be responsive to plan performance.
Our sample consists of 1 firm in oil and gas extraction and mining, 5 in manufacturing of durable
goods, 3 in manufacturing of nondurable goods, 3 in transportation, communications and
utilities, none in retail trade, 2 in finance, insurance and real estate, 2 in services and 1 in
government.
 We believe that the primary determinants of response to the survey are the workload of
the individuals in the benefits office and the strength of the personal relationship between these
individuals and the account representatives from Medstat. The Medstat account managers also
state that some of the employers have blanket policies of non-participation in research studies.
The 27 nonparticipating firms are similar in observable ways to the firms in our sample. They
range in size from 3,000 to 191,000 U.S. employees with an average firm size (~61,000) that was
                                                
5 Firm size data are based on estimates from Medstat.11
not statistically different from that of participating firms (p=.83). Industry representation for
nonparticipating firms was also not statistically different (p=.95).
Medstat reports each employer’s plan offerings in each MSA as well as the choice set in
each MSA. The choice set in an MSA is the set of plans that operate in that MSA, as reported by
the InterStudy census.
The InterStudy census overstates the number of plans available in an MSA for several
reasons. First, some plans serve only selected populations (e.g. Medicaid). We delete from the
choice set all HMOs that had no commercial enrollment.
Second, the InterStudy census lists some plans as serving certain MSAs when in fact they
only effectively serve nearby MSAs. For example, there is a plan that InterStudy lists as serving
almost all of the Tennessee MSAs, the enrollees of which are almost all in Memphis and
Nashville. This plan seems not to have the effective capacity to serve enrollees from other MSAs,
but may have a few who commute across MSAs. Finally, some plans are part of national firms
(e.g. Aetna, Cigna, Prudential). Multiple plans from these firms may be listed within a single
MSA even if the MSA is primarily served by one such plan. To eliminate these erroneous plan
choices from the choice set, we delete all plans with less than 5% share of the HMO market in an
MSA from that MSAs choice set. We computed each plan’s share of the HMO market in each
MSA from the InterStudy data.
3.2 Health plan performance data
Our measures of plan performance are based on the HEDIS and CAHPS data, as provided
by the NCQA. We had access to the measures for all plans that submitted data to NCQA. To
match the enrollment data, we use data from the 2000 NCQA reports. These data measure12
performance in 1999, and are from the first year in which the NCQA required plans to hire third
party firms to audit the data.
We base our HEDIS measure of performance on four administrative HEDIS measures:
the childhood immunization rate for measles, mumps and rubella (MMR), the mammography
screening rate, the continuity rate for primary care physicians
6 and the percentage of primary care
physicians that were board certified. We chose these measures because they are potentially
relevant to employees and have relatively few missing values.
We base our CAHPS measure of performance on six CAHPS indices: getting needed
care, getting care quickly, how doctors communicate, courteous office staff, customer service,
and claims processing. Each represents an aggregation of responses for several CAHPS
questions. The CAHPS measures of plan performance were highly correlated with one another.
Regressions of each CAHPS measure on the others yield 
2 R ’s of about .70.
To simplify the presentation and analysis, we aggregate both types of performance
measures. We standardize the HEDIS measures by dividing each measure by its standard
deviation and then summing. Because the CAHPS measures are all loosely on the same scale, we
aggregated by summing the scores on each domain.
The unit of observation for the report cards is an NCQA plan identifier. This does not
correspond exactly to the InterStudy plan identifier, which is the unit of observation at which
Medstat reports the plan offering data. We merged the report card data with the Medstat plan
offering data at the plan/MSA level. In cases where multiple NCQA plans correspond to one
InterStudy plan in an MSA we used the mean ratings across NCQA observations.
7
                                                
6 This is the negative of the turnover rate. By phrasing it in this way, a higher value of any of the measures is better.
7 For cases where the NCQA data is missing for some, but not all, of the multiple NCQA plans, we used the mean
over non-missing observations.13
3.3 Price and other plan attributes
Our ideal price measure is the menu of prices that each firm would be quoted for a
standardized coverage package.
8 This menu would likely depend on the characteristics of the
firm’s employees and negotiations between the firm and plans. It should include prices for both
plans that the firm offers and for those that it does not offer.
Our actual price measure is the premium charged by the Federal Employees Health
Benefit Plan (FEHBP) to federal government employees. We use the sum of employee and
government costs for the low benefit single coverage option. These premiums represent a similar
benefit package and, likely, a relatively homogeneous workforce. They will differ from our ideal
measures of price to the extent that there are differences in the health plan negotiation processes
between large commercial employers and the federal government. Moreover, as FEHBP
premiums are only available for plans offered by the federal government, the use of this variable
results in missing premium data, a point we return to below.
The federal government is often quoted one premium per insurer within a geographic
region, such as a state, as is likely true for many other large employers. When we lacked more
detailed data, we assumed the premium for each plan was the same across all MSAs served by
the plan. Because of differences in coding between InterStudy and FEHBP plan codes, we
matched the FEHBP data to the base data at the plan/MSA level.
We include several other basic plan attributes in the model. Specifically, we include plan
age, tax status, the percentage of plan enrollment in Medicaid and Medicare, model type and
whether the plan was part of a national chain or affiliated with Blue Cross and Blue Shield (we14
code national affiliation and BCBS affiliation as mutually exclusive). Because there are some
extreme values for plan age, we coded age using four dummies (2 years old or less, 3 to 5 years
old, 5 to 10 years old, and older than 10 years). As only the dummy for age greater than 10 years
turned out to be a significant predictor of offering in most specifications, we include only the
dummy for this age category to conserve on parameters. Model type is challenging to code
because many plans report that their model type as mixed. We code plan type based on the
fraction of providers in each of three models, group/staff, network, and IPA. Some mixed model
plans do not report these fractions. We include a dummy variable for these plans.
3.4 Missing data
One important issue is missing price and ratings data. In the MSAs where our employers
operated, we had 514 plans from the InterStudy census (used to define the set of plans an
employer could offer). In 2000, FEHBP provided 288 price quotes of which 228 were for plans
in MSAs where our employers operated. Because of differences in plan coding, these 228
FEHBP records translated into 218 plans in our sample (which was based on InterStudy census
plan definitions). The 296 plans without FEHBP information are generally plans that do not
participate in the FEHBP program.
Correspondingly, in 2000, the NCQA collected 384 ratings submissions of which 328
were for plans in MSAs where our employers operated. These 328 HEDIS records translated into
294 plans in our InterStudy-based sample. The 220 InterStudy plans without HEDIS data are
likely mostly from plans that did not respond to NCQA requests for data. Many of the plans that
replied to NCQA did not provide information on all the HEDIS and CAHPS categories that we
                                                                                                                                                            
8 If relative prices are a function of the benefit package, we would ideally observe prices from each insurer for each15
used. Of the 328 NCQA records that we use, 306 provided the CAHPS data,
9 while 277 provided
all the administrative HEDIS data.
We do not drop plans with missing price or ratings information from our analysis because
of the sample selection bias that this might cause, particularly for the fixed-effects specifications
which are identified based on relative performance. Instead, we include these plans as well as
dummy variables that indicate missing price, CAHPS and HEDIS information.
Because of the problems in identifying parameters from markets with substantial missing
data, we restrict our base sample to markets without a large fraction of plans with missing price
or ratings information. We keep markets with 6 or more plans if at least 4 plans have valid
CAHPS and FEHBP data, and keep markets with 5 or fewer plans if at least 60% of the plans
have valid CAHPS and FEHBP data.
10 We also report results from more inclusive specifications
where only 3 out of 6 or more plans need valid data. In our base sample, we have observations on
177 plans in 105 MSAs with an average of about 8.1 employers and 4.0 plans in each MSA and a
total of 3667 plan/MSA/employer observations. The fraction of missing data from our base
sample is much smaller than for the data as a whole: 20.4% of observations are missing FEHBP
data, 18.9% are missing CAHPS data, and 22.6% are missing some administrative HEDIS data.
                                                                                                                                                            
benefit package.
9 We found that plans either provided all or none of the CAHPS data.
10 Plans that were dropped from the analysis because of the missing data criteria had similar price and performance
values (to the extent that these variables were not missing), relative to plans kept in the analysis. However, the plans
that were dropped were systematically newer and more likely to be for-profit. The dropped observations had a
slightly higher percentage of enrollees in network or IPA products and had similar profiles regarding national
ownership status, BCBS affiliation, and share of Medicaid and Medicare enrollees.16
4. Results
There is considerable variation in the offering decisions across large employers. On
average employers offered about 21% of plans in their choice set. Of the 855 employer/MSA
combinations in our base sample, 22 (consisting of 6 employers over 13 markets) offered all the
available HMOs. About half of the employer/MSAs offered no plans. This was more often the
case in MSAs with fewer than 4 plans than for MSAs with 5 or more plans. Every employer had
some MSAs in which it did not offer any HMOs. One employer did not offer any plans in any of
the markets in our analysis. The employer that offered the most choice offered, on average, about
40% of the plans in the HMOs in which it operates.
There is also considerable variation in which plans are offered. Of the 425 plan/MSA
combinations in our sample, 4 (consisting of 2 plans over 4 markets) were offered by every
employer in the MSA. About one third of the plans in markets with at least 5 employers were not
offered by any of the employers in our survey.
The means of explanatory variables, taken over all plan/employer/MSA combinations in
the base sample, are reported in Table 1, disaggregated by whether the plan was offered or not.
11
These statistics do not provide a consistent picture of the relationship between plan performance
and offering. There is no statistical difference in the mean sum of the CAHPS measures. The
pattern of results for individual CAHPS measures is mixed. The plans that are not offered
perform better on 4 of the 6 domains. The offered plans perform better on the other domains,
customer service and claims processing. For the administrative HEDIS variables, the aggregate
                                                
11The fixed effects specifications do not use all of these observations for identification of the parameters because
employer/MSA combinations in which all plans are offered or no plans are offered are explained completely by the
employer/MSA fixed effects.17
HEDIS score was greater for the plans offered as was each of the four components individually.
These differences were statistically significant, but small.
Turning to the other covariates, the price information shows that the offered plans are
slightly less expensive than the plans that are not offered (about 5%). There are much bigger
differences in other plan traits. Offered plans are much more likely to be non-profit, greater than
10 years old and IPA or network models. They have more Medicare beneficiaries and fewer
Medicaid beneficiaries and are more likely to be affiliated with national managed care firms.
They are less likely to be affiliated with BCBS plans.
The findings from Table 1 may be misleading because they do not adjust for the choice
set facing employers and do not control for the other covariates. Table 2 reports the results from
the fixed effects logit models using the CAHPS measures of performance. Recall that these
models control for the available set of plans in each market. The first column reports the
unconditional relationship between the performance and the likelihood that a plan will be
offered. It suggests that better performance increases the likelihood that a plan is offered. The
sum of the ratings has a mean value of 475 and a standard deviation of 26. At the mean offer
probability of 15.2%, the coefficient of .010 implies that the offer probability would increase by
3.4 percentage points per 1 standard deviation increase in the sum of CAHPS ratings. Because no
covariates are included in this specification, this finding is consistent with the theory that
employers are attracted to high performing plans but may simply be because high performing
plans exhibit other traits that attract employers. Regardless of the reason for the observed
relationship, the results answer the policy question of whether large employers are more or less
likely to offer higher performing plans.18
The second column presents the results from the full model, which includes covariates for
price and other plan traits. The estimated relationship between performance and the likelihood of
offering remains significant and doubles in magnitude. A one standard deviation increase in the
sum of the ratings is now projected to increase the offer probability by about 7.0 percentage
points at the mean offer probability. The estimated effect of price is negative and statistically
significant. This indicates that plans with higher FEHBP prices are less likely to be offered,
conditional on the other regressors.
The coefficients on the other covariates generally have plausible signs and are mostly
statistically significant. Employers are more likely to offer plans that have existed for more than
10 years. This may reflect the importance of continuity in plan offerings. They are also less likely
to offer for-profit plans, which is consistent with the performance results if one assumes non-
profit status is a positive signal of unobserved quality (Hirth 1999). Employers appear to prefer
network model plans relative to group/staff model plans, which may reflect the desirability of the
provider panels in these plans, although we have no direct evidence to support this point.
Employers also seem less likely to offer IPA model plans. Plans with many Medicare
beneficiaries are more likely to be offered and plans with many Medicaid beneficiaries are less
likely to be offered. These findings may arise because plans with high Medicare enrollment have
traits that are attractive to commercial beneficiaries and plans with high Medicaid enrollment
have traits that are unattractive to commercial beneficiaries. However, it may also be the case
that Medicare or Medicaid payment policy affects the performance of the plans which in turn
affects the plans attractiveness to commercial beneficiaries (Glazer and McGuire 2002).
Finally, employers seem more likely to offer plans affiliated with national chains but less
likely to offer BCBS plans. The attraction to national chains may reflect an economy in19
bargaining and contracting and the lack of attraction to BCBS plans may reflect the loose
affiliations of these plans, which do not provide the same ease of contracting as do national
chains. It is important to note that these traits that are attractive to employers may also be the
same traits that are attractive to workers, particularly if they reap some of the savings associated
with contracting efficiencies.
The final column of Table 2 expands the sample to allow for markets with more plans
with missing data, as discussed in Section 3.4. This increases the number of observations from
3667 to 4500 plan/employer/MSA combinations. The coefficients on CAHPS performance and
price are reasonably stable across specifications. The other covariates continue to reflect the
attraction of employers to established, non-profit, network model plans with fewer Medicaid
enrollees, lower IPA enrollment and many Medicare enrollees and to plans that are affiliated with
a national chain.
Table 3 replicates this analysis using the administrative HEDIS measures of performance
instead of the CAHPS measures. The unconditional results, which do not control for any plan
traits, indicate a positive relationship between performance and the likelihood of offer,
suggesting again that unconditional on covariates, employers are not offering inferior plans
(column 1). The magnitude of the response to the administrative HEDIS measures is similar to
the magnitude for the CAHPS measures. The HEDIS measures have a mean of 35.7 and a
standard deviation of 2.5. At the mean offer probability of 15.2%, the coefficient of .161 implies
that the offer probability would increase by 5.2 percentage points per 1 standard deviation
increase in the sum of HEDIS ratings.
When the full set of covariates are included, the coefficient on ratings is virtually
unchanged. Moreover, the results for the other covariates are similar to those reported when the20
CAHPS summary measure was used. The price coefficient is again negative and significant.
Employers prefer established plans, plans that are not for-profit, network plans with relatively
many Medicare enrollees and few Medicaid enrollees and plans that are affiliated with national
chains and are not BCBS plans.
The final column of Table 3 replicates the sensitivity analysis reported in Table 2 for the
CAHPS measures. The results are similar to that of the full model reported in column 2, except
that the coefficient on performance is smaller (though still significant) and the price coefficient is
substantially smaller and no longer statistically significant.
Tables 4 and 5 report estimates using a logit specification without fixed effects. To
maintain comparability, the sample is kept the same, but because this analysis does not discard
observations from employer/MSA combinations in which all plans were offered or no plans were
offered, more observations are effectively included. Recall that this model imposes that the
decision of whether or not to offer a plan is based upon absolute, not relative, performance.
The unconditional model reveals no statistically significant relationship between
performance and offering. This result can be reconciled with the results from the fixed effects
logit model by the fact that a regression of performance data on MSA dummies indicates that
plan performance is correlated within markets.
When covariates are added (column 2), the results become very consistent with the fixed
effects specifications. Good performance is positively related to the likelihood of offer. A one
standard deviation increase in performance evaluated at the sample mean probability of offer
increases the likelihood of offer by 4.4 percentage points, compared to 7.0 percentage points for
the comparable fixed effects specification. Price is inversely related to the likelihood of offer,
demonstrating a similar effect to the fixed effects specification. The other covariates support21
much of the same qualitative story as before, although the sign of the coefficient on IPAs is
reversed.
In the large sample (column 3), the coefficients on performance and price remain similar
to those reported in the analogous fixed effect specification (Table 2, column 3). Column 4 adds
a variable measuring the number of HMOs in the market and thereby controls, in part, for the
degree of market competition. The coefficient on this variable is negative, indicating that
employers are less likely to offer any given plan in markets with many plans to choose from. The
other findings are similar to the other specifications, although the Medicare coefficient is no
longer significant and the CAHPS coefficient is about 20% smaller than in the full model
(column 2).
Table 5 reports analogous logit models using the administrative HEDIS measures instead
of the CAHPS measure. The estimates consistently indicate a positive and statistically significant
relationship between performance and the likelihood of offer. The price coefficient remains
negative and statistically significant across columns. The coefficients on the other covariates
yield similar conclusions to those from Table 4, although the coefficient on network is not
significant.
To help place our results in context, we examined the relationship between performance
and plan market share. We estimate multinomial logit models using two different definitions of
market share. First, we define market share as the share of the commercial HMO market based
upon data from InterStudy. This is loosely comparable to our analysis of large firm plan offerings,
because we only focus on HMO offerings.
12 Second, we define market share using the total non-
elderly population in the MSA as reported by the Census bureau as the denominator. In this case,22
the outside good is a composite of non-HMO private coverage, public coverage, and uninsured. In
both cases we include an MSA level fixed effect. We performed our analysis using the log-linear
method of Berry (1994), which includes unobserved product characteristics, and use the same
base sample of markets.
The results are reported in Table 6. The qualitative findings regarding performance are
consistent with the results from large employers. Better CAHPS performance and better HEDIS
performance are associated with greater market share. At the mean market share of 27.7% (with
no outside good), the coefficient of .009 from column 1 implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the CAHPS ratings is associated with a 4.69 percentage point increase in market share.
Note that these magnitudes are not directly comparable with earlier numbers, as plan offering by
an employer is different than plan choice by an individual.
The results regarding price are not significantly different from zero in each case. This may
suggest that the FEHBP premium data are worse proxies for the prices charged to small and
medium size firms than for those charged to large firms.
13 The other coefficients tell a story that is
similar to those reported in other tables, except that the Medicare, Medicaid and national chain
coefficients are no longer significant in most specifications, while the BCBS is significantly
positive. While we have no particular explanation for the change in the Medicare/Medicaid effect,
the national chain effect can be explained by the fact that smaller employers would be less
concerned with coverage in multiple location. The BCBS result can be explained by the fact that
BCBS plans have historically served small business markets.
                                                                                                                                                            
12 InterStudy does not provide commercial enrollment by MSA. We allocated plan level commercial enrollment to
MSAs based on the percentage of total plan enrollment in each MSA.
13 Plans are supposed to base FEHBP prices on the price that would be charged to an actuarially similar large group.23
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In competitive markets the lower bound on quality is generally determined by consumers’
willingness to pay for higher quality products. Low quality products may exist in the market if
they are sufficiently inexpensive to attract customers. In some cases there may be no market, at
any reasonable price, for products of inferior quality and these products would be driven from the
market.
Because of information imperfections in health care markets, policy makers worry that
the standard disciplinary mechanisms that prevent quality from falling too low in competitive
markets may not apply. Individual consumers may not be aware of the quality of the health care
systems they join and employers may be able to capture some of the savings associated with
offering lower quality, less expensive health plans.
Our analysis of the health plan choices of 17 large employers suggests that employers do
not preferentially offer plans with poor performance scores. Given our cross sectional research
design, we cannot definitively determine whether the positive relationship between plan
performance and the likelihood of a plan being offered reflects a conscious attempt by employers
to act as agents for their employees, perhaps because of pressure from labor markets to offer
plans with good performance, or a correlation between plan performance and unobserved plan
traits, such as provider networks. Omitted worker traits could also play a role. For example, the
fact that large employers disproportionately offer plans with high quality measures fits with the
fact that their employees are more highly compensated than average. Because the relationship
between performance and the likelihood of offering a plan gets stronger when more control24
variables are added, any remaining unobservables would not negate our findings unless they had
the opposite effect of the observed covariates.
14
Our results indicate that factors other than plan performance affect the likelihood of a
plan being offered as well. We found employers less likely to offer plans with high prices. This
finding should be interpreted with some caution. As with our analysis of the performance
measures, omitted variables may also influence our estimates regarding the impact of price. To
the extent that high-priced plans have valuable unobserved traits, this will cause the estimated
price coefficient to be upwardly biased relative to the structural coefficient. Moreover, as noted
in Section 3, the price data are imprecisely measured, which may affect the estimates. Finally,
employer response to price may be dulled by their ability to pass along higher prices to
employees, for instance through co-premiums in cafeteria-style plans.
Consistently, the analysis suggests that employers prefer plans that are more established,
non-profit, and affiliated with national chains. Though not uniform, the bulk of the evidence
suggests that employers prefer network model plans and plans with relatively few Medicaid
enrollees.
There are several limitations to this work. First, we observe data for only 17 employers.
Large employers such as these may be the most responsive to plan performance and in fact large
employers were instrumental in developing the HEDIS system. Moreover, these employers were
self selected and employers interested in performance may have been more likely to participate in
the study. Yet it may be that a few large employers can drive the market for performance and
                                                
14 Preliminary analysis using data from the prior year yielded much the same conclusions regarding the relationship
between performance on the CAHPS domains and employer offerings. However the earlier data do not indicate a
consistent relationship between the administrative HEDIS data and employer plan offerings. This might be because
the earlier HEDIS data was noisier (the earlier data was not required to be audited), or it could be that there are
omitted variables affecting the findings related to administrative HEDIS data in one or both years.25
encourage plans to improve quality. As more information about performance becomes available
pressure may mount on other employers to respond to performance when offering plans.
Another limitation of this work is that there were considerable challenges with the data.
Even though we had access to the most comprehensive database about plan performance
available, we did not have data for many plans. As discussed above, data on plan premiums was
equally problematic. Even the data on plan availability by MSA were not perfect because of
concerns about how geographic market areas for plans were coded.
It is also important to note that the measures of performance used in our analysis, though
among the most widely circulated, are not synonymous with plan quality. We do not have
sufficient data on health outcomes to assess whether the plans with better scores on our
performance variables have better health outcomes. Moreover, it may be the case that ‘quality’ is
more important at the provider level than at the plan level. But since plans can influence
employee access to providers and the care received from those providers, the health plan is an
important determinant of the quality of care and the main way in which pressure from employers
gets reflected in the health care system.
Finally, the decision about which health plans to offer is not the only way employers can
respond to poorly performing plans. They can freeze enrollment in poorly performing plans or
steer employees away from such plans. Employers may be reluctant to stop offering poorly
performing plans since employees may be reluctant to change plans. Plan changes are likely to
generate provider search costs for employees. Employers can also use poor performance as a tool
in negotiations, paying less to poor performing plans. Our analysis cannot measure any of these
responses.26
A considerable amount of effort is being made to measure plan performance.
Measurement is the first step towards helping the market function and discipline the market into
providing adequate quality care. To date, consumers have relied mainly on informal sources of
information and various agencies and accreditation bodies to assure some minimum level of
quality through licensure and certification. Only recently have we moved to disclosure of data
(mainly of HEDIS and CAHPS based report cards and measures) directly to the consumers
(individuals and employers). The extent to which this information translates into improved
performance at the plan level depends on the extent to which consumers respond to the
information. Providers have an incentive to invest heavily in improving performance only if
employers and employees can understand the signal and then alter purchasing decisions
accordingly. Though we are a long way from assessing the employer or health plan response to
information, the positive relationship between performance and the likelihood a plan will be
offered by this subset of employers is encouraging to supporters of a decentralized, employer
based health care system.27
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Table 1: Means of Explanatory Variables
a
Offer Not Offer






























































The first row contains the mean followed by the standard deviation in parentheses. The second
row contains the number of non-missing values. CAHPS values are on a 0 – 100 scale and
HEDIS variables are the rates per 100 as defined in HEDIS.
aThe unit of observation is a Plan x MSA x Employer combination. Means are taken over
observations without missing data. The number of observations, n, varies by cell because of
missing data.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.1030
Table 1 (continued): Means of Explanatory Variables
a
Offer Not Offer
























The first row contains the mean followed by the standard deviation in parentheses. The second
row contains the number of non-missing values.
aThe unit of observation is a Plan x MSA x Employer combination. Means are taken over
observations without missing data.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.1031
Table 2:





Full Model Large Sample
b










































N 1959 1959 2467
a Specifications include missing data dummies for CAHPS data, FEHBP data and the percentage
of enrollment by model type. Standard errors are corrected for clustering among observations of
the same employer within an MSA using the bootstrap.
b This sample changes the market exclusion restriction to include markets with valid matches for
CAHPS and FEHBP price data for either 60% of plans or for 3 or more plans. This raises the
number of observations from 1959 to 2467.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.32




















































N 1959 1959 2467
a Specifications include missing data dummies for HEDIS data, FEHBP price data and the
percentage of enrollment by model type. Standard errors are corrected for clustering among
observations of the same employer within an MSA using the bootstrap.
bThis sample changes the market exclusion restriction to include markets with valid matches for
CAHPS and FEHBP price data for either 60% of plans or for 3 or more plans. This raises the
number of observations from 1959 to 2467.
c HEDIS variables include: MMR immunization rate, mammography rate, provider consistency
rate and the percent of primary care physicians that are board certified.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.33










































































# HMOs in market -.163***
(.044)
N 3667 3667 4500 3667
a Specifications include a constant, missing data dummies for CAHPS data, FEHBP price data
and the percentage of enrollment by model type. Standard errors are corrected for correlation
among observations of the same plan within the same MSA using the bootstrap.
bThis sample changes the market exclusion restriction to include markets with valid matches for
CAHPS and FEHBP price data for either 60% of plans or for 3 or more plans. This raises the
number of observations from 3667 to 4500.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.34











































































# HMOs in MSA -.163***
(.039)
N 3667 3667 4500 3667
a Specifications include a constant, missing data dummies for CAHPS data, FEHBP price data
and the percentage of enrollment by model type. Standard errors are corrected for correlation
among observations of the same plan within the same MSA using the bootstrap.
bThis sample changes the market exclusion restriction to be markets with valid matches for
CAHPS and FEHBP price data for either 60% of plans or for 3 or more plans. This raises the
number of observations from 3667 to 4500
c HEDIS variables include: MMR immunization rate, mammography rate, provider consistency
rate and the percent of primary care physicians that are board certified.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.35
Table 6: Market Share Results































































































N 320 425 320 425
aHMO plan market share within an MSA sums to 100%. Estimates use MSA fixed effects.
bHMO plan market share equals the percent of persons under 65 years of age enrolled in HMO
within an MSA. The outside good is all non-HMO coverage (including the uninsured) within an
MSA.
c HEDIS variables include: MMR immunization rate, mammography rate, provider consistency
rate and the percent of primary care physicians that are board certified.
***P<.01; ** P<.05; * P<.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.